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CRIMINAL LAW
VOLUNTARINESS OF ADMISSIONS

United States v. Vigo
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona1 concluded that the
prosecution cannot introduce at trial statements elicited from an ac-

cused through interrogation unless the individual was first apprised
by the authorities of certain of his constitutional rights. The Miranda
Court articulated the precise form required; prior to the initiation of
interrogation, the authorities must warn the accused that : (1) he has

the right to remain silent, (2) any statement he makes can be used
against him in court, (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and (4) if he desires an attorney but is unable to afford one, one will

be appointed before questioning.2 The procedure of advising the accused of his rights is only applicable to instances of in-custody ques-

tioning or where law enforcement personnel have otherwise deprived
the accused of his freedom "in any significant way."'3 Voluntary, pre-

4
interrogation statements are clearly admissible.

The enumeration of these safeguards was necessary, in the Court's
estimation, to assure the continued integrity of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Interrogation of the accused by
police in a custodial setting generates "inherently compelling pres-

sures" 5 which erode the ability of the accused effectively to exercise
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. Rtv. 671, 708-16 (1968); Kamisar, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. Rxv. 59 (1966); Symposium, Interrogation of Criminal
Defendants - Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FoRD. L. Rav. 169 (1966).
2 384 U.S. at 467-73. Miranda represents a clarification and expansion of Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Defendant Escobedo was interrogated by police concerning a
murder. He was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor given an opportunity to see
his attorney. A confession extracted from him was introduced by the prosecution at his
trial. Id. at 479-83. Reversing Escobedo's murder conviction, the Supreme Court held the
statements elicited from him constitutionally inadmissible. The Court announced that
where police interrogation shifted from a "general inquiry" to the accusatory stage by
focusing upon a particular suspect, the suspect must be advised of his right to remain
silent and may not be denied the right to consult with an attorney. Id. at 491. The concept
of focusing upon a suspect was left somewhat ambiguous in Escobedo. Clarification was
attempted in Miranda, where the Court explained that the phrase referred to instances of
questioning by the authorities of individuals in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom
in "any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
8

384 U.S. at 444.

4 See note 15 infra.

5 384 U.S. at 436. The Court, after an extended review of modern police interrogation techniques, expressed the belief that law enforcement officials deliberately create a
menacing environment when questioning a person in custody. Id. at 448-58. Such an atmosphere has a deleterious effect upon fifth amendment rights in particular:
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his privilege against self-incrimination. Waiver of the Miranda rights
is permissible but, as Chief Justice Warren said in the majority opinion, a "heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."
In United States v. Vigo7 the Second Circuit confronted the pivotal question of whether a defendant who had made certain damaging
admissions had been the subject of custodial interrogation and was
consequently entitled to Miranda warnings. In deciding the issue in
the negative, the majority engaged in a subtle displacement of the
Miranda rationale, as well as an indirect application of the "totality
of circumstances" test for determining voluntariness of admissions,
enunciated in the Omnibus Crime Control Act.8
An unidentified informant, working in cooperation with an agent
of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), met with
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody in-

terrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently com-

pelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
Id. at 467.
Old. at 475. Because a constitutional right was involved, the Miranda majority believed a high standard of proof had to be met by the prosecution in establishing a waiver
by the defendant. Id.
Though the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1969), extended Miranda to certain noncustodial income tax investigations, all other circuits passing on the issue have declined to do so. In Dickerson, the defendant revealed to a
revenue agent his failure to file income tax returns. Subsequently, an agent from the
Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interviewed the defendant but
did not inform him that the division engages only in criminal investigations, nor was the
defendant given Miranda warnings. The court of appeals held that despite the lack of a
custodial atmosphere, once a defendant is the subject of an IRS criminal investigation he
must be so informed at the first opportunity and apprised of his constitutional rights. Id.
at 1114-16. Contra, United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970);
United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471, 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969);
Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1969); Muse v. United States, 405
F.2d 40, 41 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 117 (1969); United States v. Bagdasian, 598
F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1968); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 566 (lst Cir. 1968).
See generally Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under
Escobedo and Miranda: The "CriticalStage," 53 IowA L. REv. 1074, 1111-17 (1968); Note,
Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REy. 690, 696-715 (1970).
Miranda has been held inapplicable to parole revocation hearings on the theory that
such proceedings are administrative in character. See United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d
932, 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 856 (1972).
7 487 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1973).
8 18 U.S.C. § 8501 (1970). Section 3501 was enacted as title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, title II,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 210). See note 80 infra.
It should be noted at the outset that the constitutionality of section 3501 has been
seriously questioned, in that it represents a legislative modification of the strict procedure
which Miranda deemed constitutionally mandated. See note 31 infra.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:332

Robert Vigo, ostensibly to arrange the purchase of narcotics. When
no transaction was completed at the meeting, Vigo and two companions were followed by a BNDD surveillance team. Subsequently, codefendant Pagan joined Vigo. The surveillance continued for over an
hour. Finally, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Vigo's automobile was
stopped and its occupants placed under arrest by six agents. Several
packages of heroin were found in the car. 9 Following this search, a
BNDD agent allegedly gave Vigo the Miranda warnings but could
not recall having informed the defendant that anything he said could
be used against him in court. Asked if he comprehended his rights,
Vigo indicated a desire to talk.10 Admitting one of the packages contained heroin and belonged to him, Vigo sought to exculpate the
co-defendant, as well as the other occupants of the car." Both Vigo
and Pagan were indicted for possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 12 A pretrial defense motion to suppress these statements was
granted by the district court, and the government appealed.' 3
The majority and dissent in Vigo differed significantly in their
reconstruction of post-arrest events. Noting that "all the events occurred within a very short span of time after the automobile was
stopped,"'1 Judge Lumbard's majority opinion concluded that Vigo's
9 The court emphasized that all of the events following the arrest occurred in close
proximity and that the exact sequence is unclear. 487 F.2d at 298 n.2.
10 487 F.2d at 298. The BNDD agent testified that as Vigo was removed from the car he
said, "I know what you got me for." Id. at 299 n.3.
11 Vigo stated that co-defendant Pagan realized heroin was present in the car but was
not responsible for its presence. He further claimed that the other occupants were unaware heroin was in the automobile. Id. at 299.
1221 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Under section 812 heroin appears in the schedule of controlled substances. Section 841(a) makes it
"unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ....
" Penalties for violation of section 812 are set forth in section 841(b)(1)(A);
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) is a general conspiracy statute.
18 In the district court the defendants made three pretrial motions: (1) to suppress
statements made by both defendants after their arrest, (2) to suppress evidence, an undetermined quantity of marijuana, discovered in co-defendant Pagan's purse, and (3) to
suppress evidence discovered in the search of Vigo's car. Judge Motley granted the first
two motions and denied the third. United States v. Vigo, 357 F. Supp. 1860, 1362 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
The district court found Vigo's statements not voluntary within the meaning of
Miranda, and because one element of the Miranda warnings was not given, held that the
prosecution had not established an effective waiver of Miranda rights. 357 F. Supp. at
1366-67.
The appeal was restricted to the district court's suppression of evidence seized from
co-defendant Pagan and Vigo's incriminating remarks. 487 F.2d at 296-97.
The Second Circuit was unanimous in its reversal of the district court's suppression
order concerning the marijuana found in Pagan's purse. The search was deemed permissive and protective following the discovery of a loaded revolver on Vigo's person. Id. at 298.
14 Id. at 298 n.2.
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remarks were spontaneous utterances, coming prior to the commencement of "any systematic inquiry"' 5 by BNDD agents. Accordingly,
in reversing the district court suppression order the court of appeals
majority held the voluntary statements admissible, observing that none
of the "inherently compelling factors" the Miranda Court associated
with police station interrogations was present in this case.16 Although
the court could have interpreted the offering of the defective Miranda
warnings as an indication that interrogation had begun or was imminent, the majority opinion suggested the warnings served instead to
impress upon Vigo the criminality of his conduct. Consequently, the
majority felt Vigo fully understood the nature and consequences of
his statements.'

7

Judge Timbers' dissent concluded that Vigo's admissions were
made as a result of detailed questioning by a federal agent designed
to produce inculpatory statements.' 8 The case, according to Judge
Timbers, turned not upon the voluntariness of Vigo's admissions, but

upon the ability of the government to meet its "heavy burden" under
Miranda of establishing an intelligent waiver of the defendant's privi15 Id. at 299. Subsequent to Miranda it was unclear what quantum of proof was necessary to establish an incriminating admission as voluntary. The Miranda Court had said:
In dealing -with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to
find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is, of course, admissible in evidence... There is no requirement that
police stop a person who enters a police station and states he wishes to confess to a
crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by
the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
884 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted).
Professor Wright believes the Miranda Court took an ambiguous position on voluntary statements made during custody but before questioning. 1 C. WARIGTr, FEDEmL PRACTIcE AND PRocmuan § 76, at 112-18 (1969).
In Pea v. United States, 897 F.2d 627, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (en banc), the District of
Columbia Circuit adopted "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the standard for determining
voluntariness. More recently, a closely-divided Supreme Court held that where a confession is challenged as involuntary the prosecution need only establish by a preponderance
of evidence the voluntary nature of the admission. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89
(1972). 'Ar. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion argued that to maintain fifth amendment self-incrimination safeguards, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test should be employed. Id. at 494. See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 869, 886-89 (1964).
16487 F.2d at 299. The Miranda Court was particularly concerned with what it regarded as the psychologically intimidating atmosphere often associated with police
interrogations. Factors the Court identified as contributing to such an atmosphere inelude isolation of the defendant, relentless interrogation, and trickery. See 884 U.S. at
446-55.
17 487 F.2d at 299. In concluding that Vigo knew the nature and consequences of his
admissions, the majority curiously introduced in the context of a Miranda analysis of
voluntariness the concept of waiver, which is only a consideration where custodial interrogation has commenced. The use of a waiver analysis is, however, consistent with the
"totality of circumstances" approach of 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (1970). See note 8 supra.
18487 F.2d at 800-01 (Timbers, J., dissenting in part).
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lege against self-incrimination. 19 In the absence of complete Miranda
warnings, Judge Timbers deemed this burden unsatisfied.
The irreconcilable differences between the majority and dissent
in interpreting the circumstances surrounding Vigo's arrest preclude
20
a conclusive evaluation of the application of Miranda to this case.
Instead, each opinion must be analyzed in light of the facts it sets
forth. The majority characterizes Vigo's statements as voluntary, stating they occurred before "any systematic inquiry" by federal agents.
Miranda was not designed to bar voluntary admissions. Though the
precise distinction between a voluntary and custodial situation was
not fully defined by the Supreme Court, an admission arising out of
custodial interrogation clearly would not be "voluntary" in the Miranda sense. 21 The safeguards outlined in Miranda operate only when
law enforcement authorities are about to question an individual in
their custody or whose freedom has been significantly curtailed. The
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held voluntary admissions made subsequent to arrest but before interrogation admissible, despite the
22
failure of police to inform individuals in this situation of their rights.
19 Citing the suppression hearing transcript, Judge Timbers revealed that after the
incomplete Miranda rights were given, Vigo and the federal agent engaged in a discussion
concerning a package found in the car, as well as whether the other occupants were aware
of the contents of the package. 487 F.2d at 300-01 n.1. He concluded that "Vigo was being
questioned in detail." Id.
20 The district court suppression order opinion does not directly resolve the factual
conflict at the core of Vigo. Although Judge Motley found a waiver by Vigo had not
been established by the government, the court failed to detail with sufficient particularity
the factual basis for its finding. See 857 F. Supp. 1863-66; note 26 infra.
21 See note 15 supra.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 488, 426 P.2d 515, 58
Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), held that whether circumstances were custodial for the purposes of
Miranda should be determined by the use of a "reasonable man" test. This standard, or
what has been denominated the objective approach, has been followed by several circuit
courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 990 (1970);
Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1891, 1897 (9th Cir. 1969); People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d
1, 238 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 76, at 119 (1969); cf. Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1972); South Dakota
v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1180 (1978). But cf.
United States v. Phelps, 443 F.2d 246, 247 (5th Cir. 1971).
22 In United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir. 1972), a Miranda warning
was found not to be required where shortly following his arrest on narcotics charges the
defendant spontaneously uttered incriminating remarks. A Ninth Circuit panel in Klamert
v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1158, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1970), held admissible an in-custody confession
made following an incomplete Miranda warning, but prior to questioning by the police.
See Parson v. United States, 387 F.2d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Cruz, 265
F. Supp. 15, 20 (V.D. Tex. 1967); Cameron v. State, 214 So. 2d 870, 371 (Fla. App. 1968).
When an investigation reaches the point at which Miranda warnings are necessary,
the Second Circuit has held they need not be recited in a "ritualistic" fashion. United
States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1968). Initially the Second Circuit appeared to demand that right to counsel warnings be given in language closely akin to that
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The Fifth Circuit has concluded that the mere recital of either full 3
or incomplete2 4 Miranda warnings by the authorities does not transform a noncustodial situation into "custodial interrogation." By way
of analogy, the existence of the in-custody recitation of Mirandarights
should not yield the conclusive presumption that custodial interrogation occurred in Vigo. Given the facts as presented by the majority,
Vigo, although in custody, was not within the protection afforded by
Miranda.5 Conversely, accepting the additional information supplied
by Judge Timbers,2 6 the federal agent initiating questioning failed to
conform completely to the procedure outlined in Miranda, thus barring the admission of Vigo's statements as evidence for the prosecution.
Significantly, the majority found that Vigo's statements were "voluntary and admissible" under Miranda, thereby sparing the court the
in Miranda. See United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1968). More recently, the
appellate court seems to be less strict in evaluating right to counsel warnings. See United
States v. Carneglia, 468 F.2d 1084, 1091 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1973); United
States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1972).
See also Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 967
(1968).
Appellate courts have uniformly held that voluntary, self-incriminating statements
produced during general, on-the-scene investigations by law enforcement officials are outside the compass of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 463 F.2d 1258, 1259
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Utsler v. Erickson, 440 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956
(1971); United States v. LeQuire, 424 F.2d 341, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1970); Sablowski v. United
States, 403 F.2d 347, 349-50 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 376
(4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1968); People v. Gant,
264 Cal. App. 2d 420, 70 Cal. Rptr. 801 (2d Dist. 1968).
23 United States v. Owens, 431 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1970). On this point the Owens court
remarked, "By gratuitously advising [defendant] of his rights, the agent in no way conferred additional rights on him." Id. at 352.
24 United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011
(1971).
25 Two post-Miranda Supreme Court decisions illustrate the various circumstances
which may be considered custodial interrogation. Convicted of knowingly filing false income tax returns, based in part upon statements elicited from him during a prison interview with an IRS agent, the petitioner in Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), urged
reversal on the ground that adequate Miranda warnings were not given. The government
argued that the warnings were unnecessary because the investigation had been routine,
emphasizing that incarceration in this instance was for reasons unrelated to the investigation. Id. at 4. The Court held that the Miranda warnings should have been given, maintaining that the need for such warnings did not turn upon the specific reason an individual was in custody, but on whether custodial interrogation had begun. Id. at 4-5. See
1 C. WVRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 76, at 117 (1969). But cf. United States
v. Reid, 437 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1971).
Shortly after Mathis, the Court in Orozco v. United States, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), held
that an individual questioned in his bedroom, who from the outset of the interrogation
was considered under arrest, was entitled to Miranda warnings. Id. at 326-27.
26 Judge Timbers provided additional information bearing on the circumstances surrounding the Vigo admissions, including the fact that the federal agent and Vigo "discussed" the package containing heroin, as well as the knowledge of the other occupants of
the presence of narcotics in the car. 487 F.2d at 300-01 n.1 (Timbers, J., dissenting in part).
Concluding that Vigo had been "questioned in detail," Judge Timbers believed the discussion generated by this questioning was fairly extensive. Id.
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task of examining the constitutionality of section 3501 of the Omnibus
Grime Control Act.2 7 Section 3501 was apparently enacted by Congress
to "offset" the Miranda decision.28 The statute provides that a con29
fession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."
In evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, section 3501(b) establishes a "totality of circumstances" approach.80 Knowledge by the
accused of his constitutional rights, the sine qua non of admissibility
under Miranda, is not a determinant of admissibility under section
3501.31 The question unresolved in Vigo is whether these statutory
standards satisfy the constitutional imperative expressed by Miranda.
The Vigo majority, in evaluating the applicability of Miranda,
employed in part the calculus of section 3501, as the dissent discerned.82 In passing on the voluntariness of Vigo's admissions, the
27 487 F.2d at 299.
28 The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act made it plain title II was a response to the Escobedo and Miranda holdings:
After considering the testimony of many witnesses, and statements and letters of
many other interested parties, the committee found that there is a need for legislation to offset the harmful effects of the Court decisions mentioned above [Esco,
bedo and Miranda]. These decisions have resulted in the release of criminals
whose guilt is virtually beyond question.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2127 (1968).
Though the Court in Miranda had encouraged a legislative response to the problems
of maintaining fifth amendment rights in custodial situations, it made it clear that any
alternate procedure developed would have to be "at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and ... continuous opportunity to exercise it .... ." 384
U.S. at 467.
29 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1970).
30 Voluntariness under section 3501(b) is to be measured by five criteria:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, includig (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant mak-

ing the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether
such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of
which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3)whether or not
such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not
such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance
of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1970).
It should be noted that the statutory language of this section indicates that waiver
need not be demonstrated to admit a confession arising out of custodial interrogation.
81 To the extent it contravenes Miranda, the constitutionality of section 3501 is open
to serious speculation. Professor Wright has said:

The statute, insofar as it attempts to change the Miranda result, is unconstitutional. Reasonable men can and do disagree on the wisdom of Miranda, and
whether the Constitution required that decision. The Court held that it did.

1 C.

Rights derived from the Constitution cannot be taken away by act of Congress.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoczDuRE § 76, at 121 (1969).
32487 F.2d at 301 (Timbers, J., dissenting in part).
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majority noted: "None of the inherently compelling factors of stationhouse interrogation were present." 3 It added that the defendant had
spoken "with evident knowledge of the meaning and consequences
of what he said."3 4 This language suggests admissibility was determined, in part at least, on the basis of circumstances surrounding the
incriminating statements. Miranda, however, does not prescribe this
method of evaluation. Having found the admissions to have been
made before interrogation, the majority's analysis, in the absence of
a claim by the defendant of coercion, should have been completed.
By examining the issues of the defendant's knowledge of criminality
and waiver of his rights, the majority went beyond the issue of interrogation, thereby circumventing the Miranda rule. Thus, concern for
procedural safeguards was partially displaced by the court's reliance
on the surrounding circumstances test in judging the admissibility of
the confession. The result was a more relaxed standard for making
this determination. Under Vigo, a confession would be deemed voluntary based on a standard implicitly rejected in Miranda. According
to the Miranda rationale 5 only where procedural safeguards were
observed could the relinquishment of the privilege against self-incrimination be considered the product of free choice.
The majority opinion in United States v. Vigo indicates that future Second Circuit decisions involving Mirandashould be scrutinized
with care. Vigo applies a test of admissibility which appears to incorporate section 3501 in the course of what is ostensibly a Mirandagrounded analysis of the admissibility of certain damaging statements
83 487 F.2d at 299.
84 Id.
35 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), represents a paring of the reach of the

Miranda doctrine. Harris held that statements inadmissible for the prosecutor's case in
chief could nonetheless be utilized to impeach the credibility of a defendant appearing
as a witness in his own behalf. Id. at 224. In Chief Justice Burger's view, the holding was
necessary to prevent a defendant from using Miranda to commit perjury with impunity.
Id. at 225-26.
The Harris decision was made despite the presence in Miranda of dicta condemning
the use of self-incriminating admissions for impeachment purposes absent "full warnings"
and an effective waiver. 384 U.S. at 477. See 1 C. WmGnr, Fr.Ea.L PRACncE AND PRocEDURE
§ 76, at 111 (1969).
The Supreme Court recently indicated it will review the case of a suspect arrested for
rape who was given Miranda warnings by the authorities but was not informed that he
had the right to court-appointed counsel. During subsequent interrogation the accused
provided the name of a third-party he said would corroborate his alibi, but who at trial
offered testimony incriminating the accused. Michigan v. Tucker, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 1973). The Michigan Supreme Court sustained the conviction. Id. A federal district court granted the accused a writ of habeas corpus, holding on the authority of
Miranda that the testimony of the witness should have been excluded, as it represented
the "fruit" of a violation of the accused's fifth amendment rights. Tucker v. Johnson, 352
F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973).
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made by the defendant. Whether or not Miranda will be gradually
emasculated by section 3501 is an open question. However, the factual
discrepancies in the Vigo opinions highlight the ease with which the
Miranda doctrine can be thwarted should a court decide to selectively
view the facts.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE

FOURTH

AMfENDMENT

United States v. Candella
One of the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment is
that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable exclusive
of a few exceptions which are "jealously and carefully drawn".' A
prosecutor seeking to rely on evidence gathered in a warrantless search
or seizure has the burden of proving that it was justified by one of the
few authorized exceptions 2 to the warrant requirement.8 In United
1 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).

2 One of the exceptions is a search or seizure performed with the consent of the individual who is the subject of the search. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628
(1946). The consent must be "freely and voluntarily given," more than mere "acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
"A consent is not a voluntary one if it is the product of duress or coercion, actual or
implicit." United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
906 (1963). The consent must be "unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given." Id.
The "plain view" doctrine is another exception to the requirement that seizure of
evidence be supported by warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), which
states that:
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence.
Id. at 236.
Evidence obtained under the "plain view" doctrine is not the product of a search.
Bretti v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971);
United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970).
To be valid a "plain view" seizure must have been "inadvertent." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
Evidence seized by an officer in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon is also excepted from the
warrant requirement. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967). Police may also
lawfully seize evidence without a warrant when it is obtained incident to a lawful arrest.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The arresting officer is restricted, however, to a
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control," by which is
meant "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." Id. at 763.
An automobile, because of its mobility, may be searched without warrant when there
is probable cause. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970). However, in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court emphasized that probable cause alone
is not sufficient; there must also exist "exigent circumstances." Id. at 458-64, quoting
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
If there is an emergency a warrant is not required. See United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 52 (1951). A seizure without a warrant can also be made when evidence is about
to be destroyed. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
8 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v.
Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973).

